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Klaus Schwabe, born in 1932, is professor emeritus at the 
Historisches Institut of the University of Technology at Aachen, 
Germany, where he held the chair of contemporary history 
between 1980 and 1997. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of 
Freiburg. From 1972 until 1980 he was professor of modern 
history at the University of Frankfurt. 
Among Schwabe's major publications are his book Woodrow 
Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking 1918-19 
(1985); The Beginnings of the Schuman Plan (1988), which he 
edited and to which he contributed; a three-language 
documentary volume of the Paris Peace Conference (Quellen zum 
Friedensschluß von Versailles, 1997); and, most recently, the 
monograph Weltmacht und Weltordnung. Amerikanische 
Außenpolitik von 1898 bis zur Gegenwart (2006), an account of 
America 's diplomacy in the 20th century.  
Schwabe served as guest professor at The Ohio State University 
and Georgetown University , as well as at the Sorbonne and the 
University of Louvain-la-Neuve, and was a research fellow at 
Princeton University and the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo. 
He is co-editor of the Journal of European Integration History.  
The relationship between Germany and the United States has 
undergone many changes in the last century. For Klaus Schwabe, 
who has experienced these changes first-hand as a German and 
a frequent visitor to the United States, German-American 
relations in the 20 th century divide into three distinct periods. 
Schwabe described these periods as three images impressed 
upon him through his experiences.  
Schwabe's first image of U.S.-German relations came from 
growing up in West Berlin just after World War II. In order to 
rebuild, Germany needed American assistance, and the United 
States did not hesitate to provide it. Schwabe described how 
American cars and American goods in West Berlin connoted 
prosperity and progress. After the Americans prevailed over the 
Soviets in the 1948 blockade of Berlin, Schwabe said, Germans 
had an even more positive impression of the United States . In 
the aftermath of World War II, Germans needed an alternative 
national identity and political model to the legacy of Hitler, and 
many Germans looked for this in the United States.  
Schwabe first visited the United States in 1952-53 through a 
student exchange program, and he said that this visit made his 
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image of the country more complex. He was surprised to see 
American beggars who seemed to have missed their 
opportunities to partake of the American dream. Nonetheless, 
Schwabe said, most Germans remained highly optimistic about 
their country's relationship with the United States. This optimism 
was reinforced by the United States' reconciliation with other 
European countries in the 1950s and '60s, and by U.S. support of 
the Schumann Plan and the emergence of the European Union.  
The second period or image developed with the onset of the 
United States ' involvement in Vietnam. Schwabe said that while 
he defended the United States, most Germans had a growing 
antagonism toward American foreign policy. Student uprisings 
and protests in 1968 (the so-called “1968ers”) decried the 
Vietnam War, calling it a war by the rich on the poor. This second 
period was broken only briefly by the United States' positive 
involvement with the end of the Cold War. While German-
American relations were positive for a short period after the 
Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the first Gulf War renewed German 
dissatisfaction over American foreign policy.  
Schwabe described the current, third, image as a historical 
composite of the earlier two. While on the one hand, many 
Germans view the United States as an aspiring imperial power, 
the Clinton administration's activities in the Balkans were highly 
commended in Germany, and the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 
prompted strong sympathy for America .  
The current Iraq war, however, has provoked three strands of 
protest, Schwabe said. First, the German left has identified itself 
with the developing world, including Iraq. This strand of protest 
sees the United States as a threat to multiculturalism. Second, 
some Germans – predominantly the older generation – recall the 
devastating wars between the two countries. Third, many 
Germans contrast the perceived virtue of American foreign policy 
earlier in the 20 th century – e.g. the Marshall Plan – with 
present-day foreign policy, which is perceived as militant.  
Schwabe concluded by juxtaposing these three images with a 
contemporary realist assessment of German-American relations. 
While Germany no longer needs to kowtow to American foreign 
policy for security reasons, as was necessary during the Cold 
War, Schwabe claimed that numerous arguments remain for why 
the two countries should nurture a positive relationship.  
Among these reasons are America's role as one of the best 
markets for German goods, German interests in non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, and the fact that Eastern Europe, specifically 
Russia, remains a volatile region. Schwabe called this realist 
depiction of German-American relations an “enlightened” version 
of German interests, and he endorsed strong ties between the 
two countries. 
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